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DEFUSING HYDROELECTRIC BRINKMANSHIP: THE INDUS WATERS TREATY’S
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE TENUOUS
PEACE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Thomas E. Robins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Crop earnings decline every year and water shortages have affected fifty
percent of our agricultural business. The problems with India can only be
resolved with war.”1
For saber-rattlers on both sides of the Kashmiri border, water rights have become
part and parcel to the narrative of Indo-Pakistani tensions. Beginning with partition in
1947, three full-blown wars, numerous undeclared conflicts, and an active insurgency
have led to hundreds of thousands of causalities in the ongoing dispute between India and
Pakistan.2 Since both countries completed the testing of nuclear fission weapons in 1998,
the specter of nuclear conflict has cast an apocalyptic pall over the seemingly immutable
regional conflict.3 At the center of the tension between the south Asian neighbors is the
disputed region known as Kashmir.4 The mountainous region is home to a singularly
unique history, a Muslim majority with separatist elements, and abundant natural
resources. Arguably the most vital of these resources in one taken for granted in many
parts of the world: freshwater.
In an age when political scientists predict the onset of “water wars”5 and debate
rages about rapid climate change, water usage has become an essential element of
international relations, especially between riparian states. Shortly after partition and the
bloody war that followed, Indian and Pakistani leaders predicted the inevitable riparian
conflicts between the rivals and set out to solve them. The eventual consequence was the
*

Thomas E. Robins is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2014
Juris Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law.
1
Water Row Key to India-Pakistan Rivalry, THE ECON. TIMES (July 15, 2010 9:59am)
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-07-15/news/27582484_1_water-shortages-water-rowindia-and-pakistan (quoting Pakistani farmer Ghulam Sarwar).
2
India and Pakistan: The World’s Most Dangerous Border, THE ECONOMIST, May 19, 2011, available
at http://www.economist.com/node/18712525?zid=312& ah=da4ed4425e74339883d473adf5773841.
3
Hamir K. Sahni, The Politics of Water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus Waters Treaty, 26 SAIS
REV. 153, 156 (2006).
4
Kashmir is split between the administration of India and Pakistan. The Indian province encompassing
this region is Jammu and Kashmir, often abbreviated to “J&K.” Pakistan-controlled Kashmir is divided
between two administrative units: Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Balichistan.
5
For a relevant description of the water wars rationale, see Undala Z. Alam, Questioning the water
wars rationale: a case study of the Indus Waters Treaty, 168 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 341 (2002). Alam, now a
professor at Queen’s University in Belfast, provides a fascinating dissection of the water wars rationale
using the Indus Water Treaty as a foil. The classic water wars rationale is “built upon three principal
building blocks – water scarcity, a wider conflict and bellicose public statements.” While the conflict over
the Indus certainly provides all of these elements, Alam attacks the very premise of these building blocks as
erroneous. Because the dispute over the Indus contains all of these elements and has not yet led to war,
Alam posits that the entire water wars theory is theoretically questionable.
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Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. The unique treaty was negotiated with the help of the World
Bank.6 The Indus Waters Treaty (“IWT”) provides for the allocation of water from the
Indus River’s many tributaries to both countries. The basic form of the agreement divides
the “Eastern Rivers” which were allocated to India, and the “Western Rivers,” which
were allocated to Pakistan.7
Central to the IWT’s efficacy and therefore to the uneasy peace between India and
Pakistan is Article IX, which memorialized the process for the “settlement of differences
and disputes.”8 Article IX includes provisions for mediation, negotiation, and arbitration.9
This article will analyze Article IX and the related Annexures through the lens of recent
attempts at alternate dispute resolution, particularly the Neutral Expert determination
process and arbitration. In the process, this article will explore the role alternate dispute
resolution via the IWT plays in the larger scheme of Indo-Pakistani relations. In addition,
the article will lodge some criticisms of Article IX procedures and point to issues that
must be resolved in order to ensure the continued efficacy of the IWT.
II. THE INDUS WATERS TREATY OF 1960
The Indus Waters Treaty has been labeled a “model for future regional
cooperation,”10 and lauded as the “only successful agreement”11 to survive the intense
rivalry between India and Pakistan. Crafted in the “spirit of goodwill and friendship,” but
mostly due to an awareness by both nations that “attaining the most complete and
satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system of rivers,”12 was in their mutual
interest, the IWT was a compromise to essentially split the Indus’ tributaries
geographically.13
The division is more complicated, however. Some of the tributaries in question
flow from India to Pakistan, and vice versa. Thus, the IWT’s Article IV includes clauses
prohibiting either nation from altering “the flow in any channel to the prejudice of the
uses on that channel by the other Party.”14 As one might imagine, most of the IWT
conflicts between India and Pakistan have been Article IV disagreements. In anticipation
of potential conflicts over engineering works (i.e. dams) the IWT also includes a
disclosure provision. The parties are required to supply data on “relating to the work” as
much as is feasible.15
6

The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 between the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126 [hereinafter
“Indus Waters Treaty”].
7
Id. at 130, 134.
8
Id. at art. IX.
9
Id.
10
Sahni, supra note 3, at 154 (quoting Stephen P. Cohen, The US and South Asia, 545 SEMINAR 6
(2005) available at http://www.india-seminar.com/2005/545/545%20stephen%20p.%20cohen1.htm).
11
Id. at 156.
12
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 126.
13
Id., at art. II, III, IV.
14
Id. at 136.
15
Id. at 146. This provision is in and of itself “widely viewed as a process for avoidance of disputes.”
Salman M. A. Salman, The Baglihar difference and its resolution process – a triumph for the Indus Waters
Treaty?, 10 WATER POLICY 105, 107 (2008).
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In addition, the treaty created the Indus Waters Commission (“Commission”),
which consists of a high-level hydrology expert from each country.16 The Commission is
tasked with providing a conduit for communication about IWT issues between India and
Pakistan, and serves as the initial forum for IWT disagreements.17 The vast majority of
IWT questions are resolved at the Commission level. Over the years, the Commission has
negotiated the size of agricultural land India is permitted to irrigate from the western
tributaries (a twenty-two year process), the method by which flood warnings would be
delivered to downstream Pakistan, India’s drainage systems, and numerous dam
construction projects.18 In order to facilitate communication and negotiation, the
Commission meets at least once per year, and submits an annual report to both parties.19
The Commission also meets at the request of either Commissioner.20 As of 2007, the
Commission had met ninety-nine times since the ratification of the IWT.21
The IWT is unique in a number of respects. First, the treaty deals specifically with
a natural resource which forms in one nation and crosses internationally recognized (if
not entirely demarcated) boundaries into another. While water treaties are by no means a
modern phenomenon22, a treaty of this kind between two such hostile and diametrically
opposed parties in the modern era is exceptional. Second, the treaty embodies a
compromise on concepts of territoriality and sovereignty. By putting pen to paper on the
IWT, both India and Pakistan agreed to a notion of limited territorial sovereignty,
recognizing the possible effects of water use on the other party. 23 Third, as noted by
Salman M. A. Salman, Fellow at the International Water Resources Association and
former counsel with the Vice Presidency of the World Bank, the treaty is the “only
international water treaty signed by a third party.”24 Finally, the treaty is hinged on a
dispute resolution mechanism including mediation and arbitration.25 Without the
availability of recourse to alternative dispute resolution, the treaty would be largely
unenforceable.
There is little question that the IWT is a shining example of diplomatic tact and
realism. The IWT foresees many of the disputes that have arisen over the Indus, including
canal output, pollution, and water storage.26 These provisions are interesting and
invaluable to Indo-Pakistani relations, but can distract the legal reader from the most
16

Id.
Id. at 148.
18
N. A. Zawahri, India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system, 11 WATER POLICY 1,
10-12 (2009).
19
Id. at 8-9.
20
Id. at 9.
21
Id.
22
See, e.g., James L. Wescoat, Jr., Main Currents in Early Multilateral Water Treaties: A HistoricalGeographic Perspective, 1648-1948, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39 (1996). In this article, Dr.
Wescoat notes that the IWT is not the first multilateral treaty to involve the Indus. Russian agreements to
navigate the waters of the Indus preceded colonial annexations by a decade.
23
See, Erica J. Thorson, Sharing Himalayan Glacial Meltwater: The Role of Territorial Sovereignty,
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 487, 496-99 (2009). Professor Thorson provides a fascinating analysis of the
evolution of sovereignty concepts in water-sharing agreements. She posits that limited territorial
sovereignty is the paradigm of international water law, imposing a duty not to cause significant harm to the
sovereign rights of other states while maintaining the right of territorial sovereignty.
24
Salman, supra note 15, at 106.
25
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 150.
26
See generally, Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6.
17
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salient facet of the IWT. Arguably the most important element of the tripartite treaty is
Article IX: the dispute resolution provision.
A.

Article IX

The underpinning of the entire IWT is the ability of both parties to resolve discord
through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. While much of the negotiation over Indus
controversies occurs between the Commissioners, the recourse to alternate dispute
resolution – Neutral Expert determination and arbitration – is necessary for parties to
fully vindicate the legal rights granted by the IWT. In the context of the tinderbox that is
Kashmir, the ability to resolve disputes, especially by a neutral and detached third-party
or court, is absolutely essential. Article IX is especially important to Pakistan. As the
lower riparian state, most of the water that flows to Pakistan begins in India, thus
granting India a theoretical degree of control over Pakistan’s water supply.27 Arguably,
Pakistan would have little recourse in cases of Indian violation of the treaty without
Article IX.
There are several stages of dispute resolution outlined in Article IX.28 “Any
question which arises between the Parties concerning the application” of the IWT, or the
“existence of any fact” which might “constitute a breach” of the IWT are initially
submitted to the Commission.29 The Commission does not serve primarily as an
adjudicatory step in resolving disputes; rather, the Commission’s duty is to attempt to
resolve the “question by agreement.”30 In the extraordinarily rare event that the
Commission, consisting only of one Indian and one Pakistani official, is unable to bring
the parties to an agreement, the “question” becomes either a “difference” or a “dispute.”31
Differences are decided by a “Neutral Expert,” and are generally technical questions best
decided by a specialist.32 Disputes are resolved through arbitration and arise when the
issue at hand falls outside the very specific jurisdiction of the Neutral Expert.33 Generally
speaking, disputes involve fundamental legal questions, including the award of financial
compensation.34

27

See, e.g., Zawahri, supra note 18, at 5. Zawahri notes that as the upper riparian state, India can
control Pakistan’s “only source of water and threaten sustainability of its agricultural sector.” In addition, in
the event of a military conflict, India could release water stored behind dams to “submerge the oncoming
Pakistani military and obstruct their entrance to Jammu-Kashmir.”
28
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 150-52.
29
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 150.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id at 150, 202-04. Part of the wisdom of the IWT is the utilization of experts to resolve technical
questions.
33
Id. at 150.
34
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 204, 218. The only exception to the general rule regarding the
arbitration of financial disputes arises if the Commissioners agree that the Neutral Expert should determine
the question, per Annexure F, part 1 (2).
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1.

The Neutral Expert Determination: Annexure F

Per Article IX, determination by a Neutral Expert is the second recourse for the
parties, if the Commission is unable to come to an agreement.35 Annexure F, which
details the Neutral Expert determination process, lists twenty-three questions that may be
resolved by the Neutral Expert, which will not be detailed here.36 The list is expansive
and largely inclusive of most disputes that might arise under the IWT. It is important to
note that “differences” are submitted to a Neutral Expert by the Commission, and not
directly by the parties.37 In other words, the parties have a hand in selecting the expert
and presenting their respective cases, but cannot submit what they deem to be differences
directly to a Neutral Expert. The Commission holds the cards in invoking the recourse to
the Neutral Expert.
The Neutral Expert is selected either “jointly by the Government of India and the
Government of Pakistan,” or by the World Bank if the parties fail to agree on an Expert.38
The Neutral Expert is to be a “highly qualified engineer.”39 This appears to be the sole
criterion for selection, although the World Bank’s involvement in the selection process
helps to maintain the integrity of the candidate selection process. Likewise, the parties are
incentivized to agree to an expert who is highly qualified, given the complexity of the
issues within the Neutral Expert’s purview.40
The process of resolving “differences” is described in Annexure F, Part 2.41 The
Neutral expert is to “afford to each Party an adequate hearing,” and is bound in his
subject-matter jurisdiction to the provisions of the IWT or a special agreement submitted
by the Commission specifying the issues in dispute known as a compromis.42 Not
surprisingly, the Neutral Expert is also vested with authority to rule on whether or not the
difference in question falls within the twenty-three items that make up his or her
jurisdiction.43 Effectively, the IWT grants the Neutral Expert kompetenz-kompetenz to
render decisions on his or her own authority to render decisions.44 The Expert can also
35

Id. at 150.
Id. at 203-204.
37
Id. at 150.
38
Id. at 206.
39
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 206.
40
See id. at 202-06. Some examples of the complex issues that fall under the Neutral Expert’s authority
to determine include drainage basin boundary determinations (Annexure F, Part 1 (2)), the specifications of
hydroelectric projects on irrigation channels (Annexure F, Part 1 (13)), and the specifications of Storage
Works, or works “constructed for the purpose of impounding the waters of a stream” (Annexure F, Part 1
(14, 17, 19, etc.) Because of the technicalities involved, both parties are incentivized to agree to a qualified,
eminent expert in order to avoid erroneous decisions.
41
Id. at 206-08.
42
Id. See also id. at 210 (defining compromis in the IWT context).
43
Id. at 208.
44
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 30-31 (6th ed. 2012) for an apt
description of the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. The kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine is most easily
defined by its alternate name: “jurisdiction to rule on jurisdictional challenges.” In domestic arbitration
agreements, an arbitration clause contains a kompetenz-kompetenz clause in order to avoid the necessity of
a court determination as to whether the dispute in question is covered by the arbitration agreement. In terms
of the IWT, kompetenz-kompetenz simply means that Neutral Expert does not have to seek outside
authority as to whether the dispute falls within his or her mandate per Annexure F and that parties would
likely fail if attempting to challenge a Neutral Expert determination for lack of jurisdiction.
36
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deem the “difference” a “dispute,” which would require either further negotiation or
arbitration.45 These are the only substantial procedural provisions of Annexure F; much
of the authority to detail the limits of the procedure is left to the Neutral Expert.
All-in-all, the Neutral Expert determination embodied in Article IX closely
resembles arbitration, but stops short of a traditional arbitral tribunal. Neither party has
agreed specifically to allow the Neutral Expert to make a determination; rather, each
party has agreed to delegate authority to the Commission. In delegating authority to the
Commission, the parties agree to allow an expert with arbitrator-like authority to rule on
the “difference.” Thus the Neutral Expert determination process departs from traditional
arbitration by removing the choice to select Neutral Expert determination from the
parties. That said, the Commission is not independent – one Commissioner hails from
each respective party nation. There is little doubt, then, that the parties have some control
over the decision to resort to Neutral Expert determination, despite a layer of formality.
Neutral Expert determinations are binding in later proceedings, including those submitted
to arbitration.46
2.

Negotiation and Mediation: Article IX (3) and (4)

As mentioned above, when a difference is beyond the scope of issues
determinable by the Neutral Expert, the issue first goes to negotiation.47 When a dispute
arises by Neutral Expert determination, a report detailing the problem is submitted to
both parties.48 Following receipt of the report, or when it appears a report is delayed, the
parties may seek to negotiate.49 These negotiations may be aided by mediators
“acceptable” to the parties.50 If negotiation and mediation fail or are simply not amenable
to either party, the dispute may be resolved via arbitration.51
3.

Arbitration: Annexure G

Article IX, Section Five provides the method for resolving disputes via
arbitration. Arbitration can function as a proceeding subsequent to a jurisdictional
decision made by a Neutral Expert or as a stand-alone procedure via quasi-submission by
the parties:
(5) A court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the
manner provided by Annexure G1 (a) upon agreement between the Parties
to do so; or (b) at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have
begun pursuant to Paragraph (4), in its opinion the dispute is not likely to
be resolved by negotiation or mediation; or (c) at the request of either
45

Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 152, 208.
Id. at 208.
47
Id. at 150-52.
48
Id. at 152.
49
Id.
50
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 152.
51
Id.
46
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Party, if, after the expiry of one month following receipt by the other
Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph (4), that Party comes
to the conclusion that the other Government is unduly delaying the
negotiations.52
Thus, arbitration occurs as a result of two different processes. Either the difference is
deemed a dispute by a Neutral Expert, submitted to negotiation or mediation, and then
requested by a party, or the parties simply agree to submit an outstanding dispute to
arbitration.53
The IWT provides a good deal of detail on the procedure for arbitration
proceedings. The arbitral panel consists of seven arbitrators.54 A total of four are
appointed by the parties: two by each respective party.55 The remaining three, including a
Chairman, a “highly qualified” engineer, and an international law scholar, are selected
from a pool of candidates known as the Standing Panel.56 The Panel consists of four
persons qualified for each of the three above categories, chosen be agreement between
the parties.57 A complex process for appointment ensues if the parties are unable to agree
to a Standing Panel.58 After the Panel is created, the parties may either agree to the
designated Umpires or draw lots if unable to agree within thirty days of the beginning of
arbitral proceedings.59 The Court of Arbitration (“Court”), as it is referred to in the treaty,
decides “all questions relating to its competence and shall determine its procedure,”
unless the parties “otherwise agree.”60 The members of the Court enjoy immunity, but
may waive it.61 The Court may render interim decisions when time is of the essence to

52

Id.
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 152. The ability to submit disputes to arbitration independent
of a Commission/Neutral Expert determination is an attractive option and may, in fact, render the first two
steps in the traditional dispute resolution process under the IWT null and void. Then again, parties cannot
submit disputes to arbitration sans negotiation without the approval of the other party.
54
Id. at 212.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 214. If the parties are unable to agree, then the IWT calls for
action on the part of actors listed in the Appendix to Annexure G. A veritable “who’s who” of international
leaders and legal scholars are listed. Either the Secretary General of the United Nations or the President of
the World Bank is tasked with the selection of the Chairman. The engineer is to be chosen either by the
President of MIT or the Rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology. Finally, the legal expert
is to be chosen by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court or the Lord Chief Justice of
England. Id. at 222.
59
Id. at 214.
60
Id. at 216-18.
61
Id. at 220.
53
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safeguard party concerns.62 Unlike the Neutral Expert, the Court may render awards
including “financial compensation.”63
Awards rendered and approved by four Court members are final and binding.64 In
addition, awards are to be accompanied by a “statement of reasons.”65 The parties have
three months to request a clarification or interpretation of the award.66 Article IX also
incorporates the legal concept of functus officio.67 After clarification or interpretation, or
if no request is made within three months, the Court “shall be deemed to have been
dissolved.”68
III. ATTEMPTS AT ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. The Baglihar “Difference”
Two thousand five (2005) marked the first occasion since the IWT’s inception that
the Commission failed to resolve a disagreement between the parties and that the Article
IX (2) resolution procedures for the settlement of differences and disputes were
invoked.69 On January 15, 2005, Pakistan approached the World Bank, claiming a
“difference” has arisen regarding the Baglihar hydroelectric plant which India was in the
process of constructing on the Chenab river.70 While the Chenab is among the Western
Rivers as defined by the IWT, and therefore allocated to Pakistan according to Article III,
India may use the river for very specific purposes, including generating hydroelectric
power.71 The Chenab flows south from the Indian controlled northern state of Jammu &
Kashmir into eastern Pakistan’s Punjab province. The specific points of the difference are
highly technical, including the measurements of gated spillways, peak discharge of

62

Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 220.
Compare Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at Annexure F, Part 1 (2) with Indus Waters Treaty,
supra note 6, at Annexure G (23). The IWT’s provisions disallowing Neutral Experts from determining
issues regarding “financial compensation” underscores the differences between the Neutral Expert
determination and arbitration per the IWT. The purpose of the Neutral Expert, an engineer, is to interpret
the technical provisions of the IWT and determine whether particular differences can be resolved by
turning to the text of the IWT. The Court of Arbitration is meant to determine more fundamental questions
at the very core of the IWT. Financial compensation intimates wrongdoing, causation, and harm, and
therefore is not within the purview of an engineer to decide.
64
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 218.
65
Id. at 218.
66
Id. at 220.
67
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY defines functus officio as follows: “without further authority or legal
competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully accomplished.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (8th ed. 2004). In the case of the IWT, after three months, functus officio
acts as a bar to reviewability of the arbitral award, as the Court is dissolved. Indus Waters Treaty, supra
note 6, at 220.
68
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 220.
69
Salman, supra note 15, at 116.The Indus Waters Commission has dealt with a number on conflicts in
the past. This was the first occasion that either party had actively engaged to seek a Neutral Expert
determination.
70
Salman, supra note 15, at 108.
71
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 134; Salman supra note 15, at 109.
63
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design floods, and the sheer height of the dam.72 In essence, Pakistan raised concerns
about a number of the technical aspects of the dam, alleging that the dam’s construction
was in violation of treaty provisions regarding hydroelectric dam design and
dimensions.73
The World Bank’s role as a neutral third-party signatory was pivotal from the
moment the difference was raised by Pakistan. As noted above, the World Bank’s role in
the Neutral Expert process is limited. The World Bank is tasked with selecting an Expert
if the parties are unable to come to a compromise.74 The selection of an Expert, a
seemingly simple administrative procedure, was made difficult by some interpretive
problems with Annexure F.75 Annexure F permits the World Bank to make a selection, but
only “after consultation” with the parties.76 Naturally, the parties disagreed as to what
kind of consultation was necessary.77 With no IWT precedent to guide the World Bank as
to what constituted sufficient consultation, the issue was finally resolved by looking to
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) procedures,
which are in turn based on the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration Rules.78 After nearly five months, the parties agreed on one
of the engineers selected by the World Bank, Professor Raymond Latiffe.79

72

Executive Summary, Baglihar Hydroelectric Plant, Expert Determination on points of difference
referred by the Government of Pakistan under the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, at 4 (Pak. v. Ind.
2007) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/2235461171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf [hereinafter Baglihar Expert Determination]. Neutral Expert Prof.
Raymond Lattife made six specific findings on the technical aspects of the Baglihar dam project. The
particular points of dispute are highly important to the effective division of the Indus Waters and the
livelihoods of thousands in both countries. That said, for the purposes of this article, the technical
dimensions of the disputes will not be expounded upon beyond what is necessary for the legal reader to
understand the basic conflict. According to the Expert Determination, the Baglihar Dam has an installed
capacity of 450 MW and stands at over 144 m (472 ft.) in height, resulting in a crest elevation of 844.5 m
asl (2770 ft.)
73
Baglihar Expert Determination , supra note 72, at 4.
74
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 206.
75
Salman, supra note 15, at 109.
76
Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 206.
77
Salman, supra note 15, at 109-10.
78
Id. at 109. Specifically, the World Bank utilized a process that was nearly identical to the arbitrator
appointment Article 6(3) of the original 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which is roughly equivalent
to Article 8(2) of the revised 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See Arbitration Rules of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec.
15, 1976) and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as Revised in 2010, G.A. Res. 65/22, at 8-9, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/65/22 (Jan. 10, 2011) [hereinafter “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”]. The World Bank compiled a
list of qualified engineers from around the world and ensured that there were no conflicts of interest (2(a)).
The World Bank then sent the list to the parties, who communicated their preferences to the World Bank.
(2(b)). The parties agreed to Prof. Latiffe’s appointment per 2(c), rendering procedures such as 2(d), which
would have required the World Bank to select the Neural Expert unilaterally, null and void. Salman, supra
note 15, at 109-110.
79
Baglihar Expert Determination, supra note 72, at 4; Salman, supra note 15, at 110. Prof. Latiffe is a
highly qualified Swiss engineer. He is a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.
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After the parties agreed that the Baglihar issue was, in fact, a “difference,”80 and
selected a Neutral Expert, the dispute resolution process finally began. Prof. Latiffe
requested that the ICSID assume the “coordination of the process and logistical
support.”81 Early in the process, it was agreed that the Determination would be based on
the exchange of written materials.82 The process involved six party meetings, multiple
submissions of information, and memorials.83 Prof. Latiffe even visited the Baglihar dam
itself in October 2005.84
Prof. Latiffe rendered a decision in February 2007, almost two years after
Pakistan first submitted the difference to the World Bank.85 The decision called for some
relatively minor changes to the Baglihar project, including reducing the height of the
structure by 1.5 meters, but did not stop the project or require more water to flow to
Pakistan.86 Both sides declared some measure of victory, while Prof. Latiffe wrote that
the “Authors of the Treaty” were the successful party in the resolution of the difference.87
The Times of India called the decision a “vote of confidence for its Kashmir development
projects.”88 Indian sources reported that Pakistan claimed victory as well, noting that the
Neutral Expert “acceded to most” of the issues Pakistan raised. 89 Neither party could
admit that the decision simply called for some technical changes to the dam project.
The decision did not halt the project, nor did the decision simply allow the Indians
to continue constructing a dam that was not in compliance with some technical IWT
provisions. The practical consequences of the Neutral Expert determination were a twoyear delay in realizing the project’s development, a decision that did almost nothing to
alleviate Pakistan’s concern that India might use the dam to control the flow of the

80

Salman, supra note 15, at 109. Technically, the first issue at hand was whether the issue was at the
level of a “difference” in the IWT context. The World Bank had to make a conclusion about this matter
before beginning the Neutral Expert selection process, which explains, in part, that an Expert was not
selected until May 2005.
81
Baglihar Expert Determination, supra note 72, at 1. The ICSID is one of the five institutions
comprising the “World Bank Group.” The ICSID “assists member countries in settling their investment
disputes with private sector corporations or individuals of other states.” While both parties endorsed ICSID
coordination, India is not a member to the ICSID convention, signed by 163 nations. Salman, supra note
15, at 109.
82
Baglihar Expert Determination, supra note 72, at 2.
83
Id. at 2-3.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
See generally, Baglihar Expert Determination, supra note 72. Prof. Latiffe determined that the “dam
crest elevation” was not at the lowest possible point. As such, he concluded that the elevation should be
reduced from 844.5 m to 843.0 m, simply meaning the structure should be reduced in height by 1.5 m. Id.
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Chenab River90, and a stamp of approval on Indian hydroelectric projects affecting
Pakistani downstream waters. If Pakistan’s goal was indeed to stop the Baglihar project
for fear of a loss of water volume downstream, then India was decidedly victorious. In
any case, the Baglihar determination solved the long-standing conflict over the project
and allowed both parties to move on with a measure of dignity. Most importantly, the
“difference” was resolved peacefully.
B. The Kishenganga “Dispute”
In Pakistan’s second attempt to resolve a hydroelectric power issue, the issue was
raised earlier – with a clear eye toward halting the project altogether. Pakistan requested
arbitration on May 17, 2010, while the Kishenganga dam was still under construction.91
As in the request for a Neutral Expert determination, this marked the first occasion in the
IWT’s fifty-year history that either Party has requested arbitration.92 Pakistan raised two
central questions:
a. Whether India’s proposed diversion of the river Kishenganga (Neelum)
into another Tributary, i.e. the Bonar Madmati Nallah, being one central
element of the Kishenganga Project, breaches India’s legal obligations
owed to Pakistan under the Treaty, as interpreted and applied in
accordance with international law, including India’s obligations under
Article III(2) (let flow all the waters of the Western rivers and not permit
any interference with those waters) and Article IV(6) (maintenance of
natural channels)?
b. Whether under the Treaty, India may deplete or bring the reservoir level
of a run-of river Plant below Dead Storage Level (DSL) in any
circumstances except in the case of an unforeseen emergency? 93
In May and June, the parties each selected two arbitrators.94 To complete the
Court, three additional arbitrators, or “Umpires,” had to be selected from the Standing
Panel according to the procedures set out in Annexure F (7).95 The parties could not
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agree, and thus the selections were made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
the Lord Chief Justice of the England and Wales, and the Rector of the Imperial College,
London, respectively.96 This process was complete in December 2010.97 The Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) was selected to act as Secretariat.98
The Court’s first meeting took place in January 2011.99 The Pakistani delegation
immediately raised two procedural issues. Given the context of the dispute, Pakistan
sought recognition on the part of India that any continued efforts to construct the
Kishenganga dam would be at India’s own risk.100 In addition, Pakistan warned that it
would seek “provisional measures” per Annexure G (28), amounting to an injunction on
continued construction at the dam site.101 Pakistan noted that sunk costs and the difficulty
of removing dam structures might cause the Court to fashion a decision not wholly
equitable to Pakistan.102
Communications were traded for several months, until August, 2011. On August
25-27, the Court held an interim measures hearing.103 Pakistan specifically requested four
types of relief at the hearing: (1) that India should cease work on the Kishenganga dam
until the Court rendered an award (2) that India should inform Pakistan and the Court of
any developments on the Kishenganga that might alter the status quo (3) that India should
recognize that any additional steps in the Kishenganga construction process were taken at
India’s own risk, leaving the possibility open that the Court could order the works
modified or dismantled and (4) any further relief deemed necessary. 104 India predictably
argued that the “‘circumstances of the case’” were not “‘such to justify ordering interim
measures’” per Annexure G (28).105
The Court noted that provisional measures were an “extraordinary recourse” per
the IWT, but ruled that provisional measures were necessary to “‘avoid prejudice . . . to
the final solution’” of the dispute.106 Pakistan was only partly successful in halting
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construction at Kishenganga. The Court ruled that temporarily enjoining some of the dam
works, including the powerhouse facility and bypass tunnels, were not necessary to avoid
prejudice to the award.107 The Court did, however, halt the construction of the dam itself,
because the dam would “eventually enable India to exercise a certain degree of control
over the volume of water” reaching Pakistan.108
In the Interim Order, the Court noted that it would strive to render a final decision
within six months of hearing on the merits.109 The Court came close to meeting its own
optimistic deadline. The hearing on the merits of the case was held on August 20-31,
2012. A partial award was rendered by the Court on February 18, 2013.110 As to the first
dispute, the Court found that India was permitted to divert the waters of the Kishenganga
in order to create hydroelectric energy, limited only by the minimum flow maintenance to
be set in the final award.111 With regard to the second dispute, the Court held that India
could not deplete the reservoir below dead storage level.112 Without delving into the
specifics of each issue, the practical result was that India was successful on the first issue
and Pakistan on the second. Much like the Baglihar difference, both sides claimed
victory.113 Nevertheless, the decision allows India to complete construction on the
Kishenganga dam.114 Thus, Pakistan’s attempt to halt construction altogether failed. A
final award, complete with a finding as to the appropriate minimum flow level through
the Kishenganga dam, will be rendered “no later than the end of 2013.”115
IV. ANALYSIS
The IWT’s Neutral Expert determination and arbitration provisions have been
employed only once respectively. The rarity with which Neutral Expert determination and
arbitration have been invoked may be a testament to the Indus Waters Commission and
the negotiation and mediation provisions contained in the early paragraphs of Article IX.
Conversely, politics and increasing hostilities in the region may provide a more apt
alternative explanation. Either way, Article IX’s alternative dispute resolution provisions
107

Id. at 44-46.
Id. at 46.
109
Id. at 44.
110
In re The Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pak. v. India), Partial Award, (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2013) http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2101, at 202 [hereinafter “Kishenganga Partial
Award”].
111
Id. at 201.
112
Dead level storage is the minimum water level permissible in a reservoir according to the terms of
the IWT. See Indus Waters Treaty, supra note 6, at 170, 174. Dead storage levels are relevant to a
procedure known as drawdown flushing which removes sediment from the bottom of a reservoir by
reducing the water level (below dead level), and then allowing the natural flow of the river to remove the
sediment. Pakistan essentially argued that drawdown flushing would allow India to exercise control over
the flow of water into Pakistan. This is because the procedure might involve a disruption in water flow
while the reservoir is re-filled after the procedure is complete. The Court agreed, and held that alternative
procedures would allow India to remove sediment and reduce the risk of a water cut-off. Kishenganga
Partial Award, supra note 110, at 190-200.
113
See Ashfak Bokhari, Kishanganga Verdict a Tilt in India’s Favour, DAWN.COM (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://dawn.com/2013/02/25/kishanganga-verdict-a-tilt-in-indias-favour/.
114
Kishenganga Partial Award, supra note 110, at 201.
115
Id. at 174.
108

401

have become a vital component of the IWT. But a number of potential problems with
Article IX alternative dispute resolutions are demonstrated by the descriptions of those
processes above. First, the enforceability of the awards rendered by either Neutral
Experts or the Court of Arbitration may give rise to problems in the future. Second, the
timeliness of the decisions rendered threatens to undermine the efficacy of those awards.
Third, Pakistan’s recent turn toward Article IX provisions may indicate the wave of the
future – constant and cyclical (and potentially meritless) claims raised as dilatory tactics,
largely to appeal to a political base. These issues must be addressed in order to maintain
the integrity of the dispute resolution process and the continuing validity of the IWT
generally.
A. Enforceability
Both India and Pakistan have vowed to abide by the decision rendered by Prof.
Latiffe in the Baglihar difference,116 despite some indication that Pakistan might move for
arbitration on the issue.117 India affirmed its intention to “fully and wholly abide by any
decision taken by the Court of Arbitration” on the Kishenganga dispute, citing the
“‘sanctity’” of the IWT and India’s intention to “‘build confidence and trust’” with
Pakistan.118 The IWT does not provide much in the way of explanation for the
enforcement of Neutral Expert determinations or arbitral awards. Per Annexure G,
Neutral Expert determinations are “final and binding.”119 The same language is used to
describe arbitral awards.120 No further means of enforcement or language to explain any
possible consequences can be found in the IWT.
That Pakistan threatened arbitration on the Baglihar difference and raised
questions about the feasibility of the Court’s award regarding Kishenganga should raise
serious concerns about the enforceability of the alternative dispute resolution provisions
of Article IX. Pseudo-appeals to the Court after unfavorable results at the Neutral Expert
level would eviscerate the process of dispute resolution. The resort to arbitration is not
technically an appeal from a Neutral Expert decision – Article IX is not “hierarchical.”121
In fact, Neutral Expert decisions are binding on the Court of Arbitration, per Annexure F,
Part 2 (11). But the provision itself indicates that the same basic issue in a different form
might be raised in arbitration. “If any question . . . which is not within the competence”
of the Neutral Expert is raised during the course of the determination, then that question
must be decided either through negotiation/mediation or by arbitration. 122 Thus a party
could simply raise an issue of financial compensation, automatically entitling that party
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to a separate proceeding.123 Such a proceeding could essentially become a re-hearing of
the issues already raised in a different format, depending in part on whether both
proceedings would continue simultaneously.
In addition, Pakistan’s concern about the efficacy of the Court’s potential award
was a reasonable one. At the hearing on the merits, the Pakistani representatives noted
that the construction of such a large project was not “an easily reversible” process, and
requested notification if India took steps that would have an “adverse effect” on Pakistani
interests.124 The question remains as to whether a Court award requiring the dismantling
of the dam would have been honored. India, for its part, openly “expressed skepticism
that the physical dismantling of the dam could ever be necessary.”125 In reality, a decision
calling for dismantling the dam would likely have been impractical, specifically because
the dam was already well underway. The sheer economic realities may have affected the
Court’s decision – India would likely be hard-pressed to simply scrap the project, which
is expected to cost the country more than $670 million (US).126 Pakistan’s enforceability
concerns are now largely irrelevant, except with respect to the Court’s finding on
minimum flow. The result of an award in Pakistan’s favor, which could result in
significant financial loss on India’s part, however, has yet to be seen. The concern will
likely persist in future Article IX proceedings.
Enforcement of Neutral Expert determinations and arbitral awards is vital to the
protection of both parties, but absolutely essential to Pakistan as the lower riparian state.
The result of a favorable decision for Pakistan that could not be enforced would be
disastrous. Pakistan’s concern that India will someday “turn off the tap,” might then
trump a half-century-old treaty obligation, and lead to unilateral and ill-advised
actions.127 The threat of conflict over water may, in fact, be the concern keeping both
parties in line. That said, if one party perceives the resort to Article IX as a losing
proposition, one wonders how long the IWT can maintain the balance.
For now, specificity in the enforcement regime is not needed, as both parties have
acquiesced to the authority of the Neutral Expert and the Court. Perhaps the foundation of
treaty-based arbitration, much like domestic counterparts, is the freedom to contract. By
analogy, the parties agreed to resolve disputes via the IWT and Article IX in 1960, and to
abide by the decisions of the Commission, Neutral Experts, and Courts of Arbitration.
Nonetheless, without a body of law or an organization to mete out compensation in the
case of a breach, and with such high stakes, the future of the enforceability of IWT
dispute resolution decisions is seriously in question. Enforcement of Neutral Expert
determinations and arbitral awards is largely up to the parties. Currently, the answer to
the potential for enforceability problems is the will of both parties to maintain peace and
the pattern of riparian cooperation.
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B. Timeliness
The resolution of the Baglihar difference took a total of more than two years.128
Pakistan requested arbitration regarding the Kishenganga dispute in May 2010.129 The
Court took nearly two and one-half years to render an initial award.130 If the Court’s selfimposed deadline is met, the Kishenganga dispute will have taken nearly three and onehalf years to resolve.131 Admittedly, the issues are both technical and of serious import.
At stake is the livelihood of people on both sides of the Kashmiri border. The very
purpose of arbitration, however, is the efficient and cost-effective resolution of conflicts;
decisions that take more than three years defeat the purpose of arbitration and alternative
dispute resolution.
A decision taking three years can have devastating effects on both parties. India
loses the potential benefit of hydroelectric power on an ailing power grid, and costs
associated with the construction delay.132 Pakistan suffers uncertainty amidst pressure to
take the fight to India.133 Both sides experience political pressure to take a hard line given
the political sensitivity of Kashmir. While lengthy and thorough proceedings may
produce more even-handed results, more efficient proceedings and quicker results will
defuse tension and allow each party to move on. Perhaps most importantly in terms of
arbitration procedure, the current lengthiness of Article IX alternate dispute resolution
procedures favors a party seeking to employ dilatory tactics.
The problem is easily solved. Both Neutral Experts and Courts of Arbitration have
the authority to set guidelines and procedural rules.134 Rules can be established to speed
up the proceedings in two distinct fashions. One the one hand, the arbitral court or the
Neutral Expert can establish a strict deadline by which to render a decision. One the other
hand, rules must be established to simultaneously encourage party cooperation with that
timeline. For guidance on these provisions, experts and arbitrators would likely turn to
internationally accepted arbitral rules, much like the World Bank did in the case of the
Baglihar difference.
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UNCITRAL and the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) publish rules
that may help to produce more expedient results. Article 25 of UNCITRAL’s arbitration
rules allows no more than forty-five days for the communication of “written
statements.”135 Incorporating a rule with a strict time limit for each party to state their
claim or defense would prevent scenarios in which parties seek to tack on claims with
each successive response. An Article 25 rule would also prevent parties from delaying
their responses unnecessarily. The exchange of statement in the Kishenganga interim
measures arbitration took the better part of seven months – far too long.136 Article 26
provides that a party seeking interim measures may be liable for any money damages
cause by those measures if the arbitrator(s) later determines that the measures should not
have been granted.137 This rule effectively deters parties from frivolous attempts to seek
interim measures. Additionally, Article 30 mandates termination of the proceedings if the
claimant fails to communicate an appropriate statement of the claim and continuation of
the hearing in the absence of the respondent if the respondent fails to answer the claim.138
Arbitration may continue if a party fails to appear to present their case.139 If a party
refuses to produce evidence of their position, the arbitrator may simply render a decision
on the evidence submitted.140
The ICC’s Arbitration Rules share many common rules with UNCITRAL. In
addition, the ICC Rules provide more guidance in the decision as to costs. Article 37(5)
specifically allows the arbitrator to consider the “extent to which each party has
conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”141 The ICC rules
are also more specific with regard to timelines. According to Article 30, the arbitrator(s)
must render a decision within six months of the signing of the Terms of Reference, which
amounts to the beginning of the arbitral hearing(s).142
Incorporating rules like those employed by UNCITRAL and the ICC would help
to speed up the Neutral Expert determination or the arbitral tribunal by encouraging
responsible party behavior. Stricter timelines could also be established, which would
avoid delays in awards. Assessing costs to a party seeking to delay the proceedings would
be an effective method of deterring dilatory tactics. While the IWT makes no reference to
punishing parties for dilatory tactics, both Annexures F and G allow the respective
Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration discretion in making awards.143
Given previous reliance on ICSID/UNCITRAL rules for guidance in Article IX
proceedings, it is likely that future Neutral Experts and Courts of Arbitration will look to
accepted sources of arbitral rules to fill in the gaps in the IWT’s alternate dispute
resolution provisions. This is both natural and necessary. Outstanding disputes over such
issues of national import to both India and Pakistan simply cannot take two years to
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decide. Political pressures and economic realities command speedier decisions.
Determinations and awards must be timely rendered in order to maintain the effectiveness
of the IWT.
C. The Danger of Chronic and Cyclical Claims
In both the case of Baglihar difference and the Kishenganga dispute, Pakistan
initiated the alternate dispute resolution process. After political posturing, Pakistan
disavowed arbitration on a number of additional controversial Indian hydroelectric dam
projects.144 India’s Wullar Lake project, however, is still under intense Pakistani scrutiny,
and may result in the implementation of Article IX provisions for alternative dispute
resolution.145 Pakistan’s recent turn to solving water disputes via Neutral Expert
determination and arbitration is partly due to an underdog mentality which stretches to
the top levels of government. Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner claimed as recently
as 2008 that India would “make Pakistan a barren land” through the construction of dams
on the western rivers.146 Pakistan has developed a clear position in line with that rhetoric:
to oppose vehemently Indian attempts to dam western rivers. India, in turn, has resorted
to attacking Pakistan’s credibility. In the hearings on the Kishenganga Interim Orders,
India argued that Pakistan was “playing victim” and that the evidence introduced was
“’inaccurate, emotion-laden, and inflammatory.’”147
While Pakistan has legitimate concerns about water usage and shortages148, and
has only invoked expert determination and arbitration once each respectively, the Islamic
Republic runs the risk of filling the role of the spoiler. As mentioned above, Article IX’s
procedures, if maintaining their current length and thoroughness, favor the party
interested in halting development. Pakistan must tread carefully in raising claims, and
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refrain from doing so for sheer political capital among radicals.149Although it may seem
that Pakistan has nothing to lose but water rights in seeking arbitration, an uptick in
claims may have a serious chilling effect on the dialogue encouraged by the IWT, and
India’s willingness to participate in not just Article IX procedures like Neutral Expert
determination and arbitration, but Commission negotiation as well.
If India senses, as some commentators have, that the IWT has simply become a
tool to delay the production of much-needed power in Kashmir, New Delhi may begin to
reconsider its commitment to the IWT’s provisions.150 But if Pakistan must tread
carefully in raising claims, India must simultaneously maintain its commitment to the
IWT. Attacking Pakistani credibility, as Indian representatives did during the course of
the Kishenganga interim measures hearing, only serves to escalate the Indus discourse.151
Such statements lend to Pakistani fears that India is not acting in good faith. In addition,
India must refrain from threatening openly to abrogate the treaty. Indian officials warned
of a unilateral withdrawal after Pakistani-based militants attacked the Indian Parliament
in 2001.152
If the number of serious issues with dam construction is actually as high as
Pakistan intimates, the IWT’s model of riparian cooperation may have already failed. It is
more likely that Pakistan is responding to political pressures and serious shortcomings in
water management. In order to function appropriately, and maintain legitimacy, Article
IX’s Neutral Expert determination and arbitration provisions should be reserved for
resolving conflicts that cannot conceivably be settled through negotiation and mediation.
V. CONCLUSION
The IWT is representative of a problem not easily defined or solved. Were it the
case that the waters of the Indus could simply be divided equally by treaty, Article IX
would be unnecessary. But that is not the case. The conflict between upper riparian states
and lower riparian states is immutable, natural, and constant. It is a consequence of the
149
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Court took this allegation seriously, it was the first issue discussed (out of turn) in the partial award. See id.
at 134. The Court wisely dispensed with this contention by expressly denying that the award would have
any effect on the sovereignty of Kashmir. Id.
152
Alam, supra note 5, at 349.
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complicated relationship between water-sharing nations that diplomatic creatures such as
the IWT exist, and it is through their dispute resolution mechanisms that they succeed or
fail.
Article IX procedures for negotiation and mediation, particularly at the
Commission level, have been used throughout the history of the IWT to solve minor
water-sharing problems. It is due in large part to Article IX that the IWT has survived the
Kashmiri conflict, the nuclearization of India and Pakistan, and one of the most
contentious rivalries in the modern era. India’s push for hydroelectric power in Kashmir
has provoked Pakistan to seek relief through Article IX’s Neutral Expert and arbitration
provisions. In the case of the Baglihar difference and the Kishenganga dispute, Pakistan
brought to an international forum the fear that India might control the flow of water into
Pakistan.
Negotiation, mediation, Neutral Expert determination, and arbitration have thus
far staved off a water war between India and Pakistan. Should the IWT remain effective
at defusing hydroelectric brinkmanship between the parties, that paradigm will remain,
and the radicals who call for war will be silenced. Questions about award enforcement, a
decided lack of timeliness in arbitral decisions, and the potential for repeated or frivolous
requests for arbitration, however, threaten to undermine the efficacy of Article IX, the
IWT, and a tenuous peace based in part on the ability of both India and Pakistan to utilize
the waters of the Indus. The continued relevance of the IWT depends fundamentally on
Article IX’s effectiveness in resolving the recent spate of controversies involving Indian
hydroelectric dam projects.
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